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Xhe idea of monetary policy aimed at
producing a stable price level has gained
increasing support in the United States
in recent years. In 1991, the Neal Resolu-
tion proposed to make such a policy ob-
jective law. Elsewhere, the notion of
price stability has also become more
popular. For example, the central banks
of Canada and New Zealand recently
adopted explicit multiyear targets for in-
flation, and a commitment to price stabil-
ity is widely thought to be a necessary
condition for successful monetary union
in the European Community.
During the past decade, inflation has been
reduced significantly, and many observers
believe that further moderation may be in
store in the next several years. Neverthe-
less, price stability remains an elusive
goal both here and abroad.' This
Economic Commentary discusses
some of the reasons why price stability
is so difficult to achieve. One explana-
tion lies in the nature of monetary tar-
geting. Another is simply the absence
of an explicit commitment to a long-
term objective for the price level.
• The M2 Target
The Federal Reserve System was created
in 1913 under the umbrella of a gold stan-
dard. Our currency was fully convertible
into gold until 1933, and indeed, some
vestiges of convertibility lingered on un-
til 1971. But since 1971, the monetary
standard has had no anchor other than the
annual monetary targets.
The wide ranges assigned to the tar-
geted aggregates and uncertainty about
the income velocity of money have
made the monetary targeting exercise
problematic as a vehicle for achieving
price stability. The uncertainty induced
by the broad ranges is compounded by
the practice of building the annual
monetary targets on the previous year's
actual fourth-quarter average of the
money stock (assumed here to be M2)
rather than on the midpoint of that year's
target. This procedure means that tar-
get misses are forgiven; consequently, the
level of M2 will be highly unpredictable
over long horizons.
To illustrate how the current practice
causes uncertainty about the future
money stock, consider that the M2 tar-
get range for 1992 is four percentage
points wide (2.5 percent to 6.5 percent).
Without knowing precisely where in
this range we will end the year, and
assuming that future M2 targets are also
four percentage points wide, the poten-
tial target range has an eight percentage
point spread at the end of 1993 — from
roughly 5 percent to 13 percent (see fig-
ure 1). In only five years hence, the
range of uncertainty about the M2 level
would be 20 percentage points wide
(from 12.5 percent to 32.5 percent).
One way to narrow the range of possible
outcomes for both M2 and prices would
be to specify a multiyear path for M2.
Such a path would not remove all of the
questions about the aggregate's future
growth, but it would limit the range of
uncertainty to the 4 percent bands around
the annual targets, regardless of the fore-
cast horizon.
It may be risky to rely exclusively on
an M2 path to achieve price stability,
however, because of the potential for un-
Price stability as a long-run objective of
monetary policy has gained increasing
support in recent years, both in the
United States and abroad. One way to
achieve this goal without inhibiting the
Federal Reserve's short-term objectives
may be to target a long-run path for
the price level. Such a multiyear target
would provide a consistent benchmark
for setting annual monetary growth
ranges in the presence of uncertainty
about the income velocity of money.
expected changes in its velocity trend.
Among all of the monetary aggregates
— currency, the monetary base, M1,
M2, and M3 — only M2 has exhibited
a constant trend in velocity over the
last 30 years. However, there is no
guarantee that this will continue. From
1869 until 1945, for example, M2
velocity declined at an average annual rate
of 2 percent; it then rose at the same pace
in the 10 years following the war.
Although M2 velocity has been con-
stant on average for the last 30 years,
quarterly values fluctuate, sometimes
widely: The standard deviation of
quarterly growth has been an annual-
ized 4 percent since 1960. The poten-
tial exists for both permanent and tem-
porary shifts in velocity. In the past,
temporary shifts have been associated
with the rise and fall of interest rates
or, more precisely, with the opportunity
cost of holding M2 balances. (Oppor-
tunity cost is the difference between
market interest rates and interest rates
paid on deposits included in M2.)
ISSN 0428-1276Throughout the most recent recession,
the opportunity cost of M2 fell, but,
atypically, M2 velocity did not. This
unusual behavior has raised the ques-
tion of whether there has been a perma-
nent shift in M2's velocity trend.
Unfortunately, we cannot clearly recog-
nize such a shift until well after a change
has occurred. The length of time needed
to distinguish a change in the trend
depends on the relative size of the per-
manent and temporary shifts. In the case
of M2 and the other monetary aggre-
gates, the variance of temporary shifts is
quite large relative to the variance of per-
manent shifts. For example, if the M2
velocity trend began to grow at 2 percent
per year, it would take several years for
analysts to be sure that this was not just a
temporary fluctuation. By that time, the
economy would have suffered the costs
of a persistent unexpected shift in the
price level (by an additional 2 percent per
year). One way to hedge against the risks
of an unexpected shift in velocity would
be to specify the annual M2 targets in the
framework of a multiyear path for the
price level.
• A Price-Level Objective
In December 1983, then Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker defined price sta-
bility as a condition that exists when
people make decisions "... on the basis
that 'real' and 'nominal' values are sub-
stantially the same over [a suitably long]
planning horizon...."' This sentiment
was echoed more recently by current
Chairman Alan Greenspan: "For all prac-
tical purposes, price stability means that
expected changes in the average price
level are small enough and gradual
enough that they do not materially enter
business and household financial
decisions.,,6
We can make this definition of price
stability operational by specifying a
time path for the trend in a specific
price index that extends indefinitely
into the future. For example, suppose
that policymakers decide to stabilize
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
Federal Reserve could specify a target
path for prices that would gradually de-
celerate until the price-level trend be-
came horizontal. Price stability would
be achieved if the actual CPI moved
along this path.
Price-level targets should also include
bounds around the target path to let the
public know how far the index will be
allowed to stray before action is taken
to bring it back in line. An example of
such an operational definition of price
stability is shown in figure 2. The tar-
get path is based on the actual CPI in
December 1989 growing 5.5 percent
that year, 5 percent in 1990, and then
declining half a percent each year until
the path becomes horizontal in the year
2000. We have set bounds of plus and
minus 3 percent around this trajectory.
To our knowledge, there is only one case
in which a central bank based its policy
actions on a price-index target. This was
a six-year episode in the 1930s when the
Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, tar-
geted that nation's CPI at around 100.
Figure 3 shows that the actual price level
stayed well within 3 percent of this figure
throughout all six years, crossing the
price target twice. Although this was a
rather brief period in history, it illustrates
that a measurable objective for price
stability can be achieved.
• Why Not an Inflation Target?
Part of the opposition to a price-level
target may stem from confusion about
the way price information is used to guide
policy actions. The price level can be
thought of as the sum of two components:
a trend determined by the monetary
authorities and a transitory component as-
sociated with real shocks to the economy.
Many economists oppose price-level tar-
geting because real shocks, such as oil
shortages, droughts, and changes in the
tax system, dominate short-run fluctu-
ations in the price level.
In 1968, for example, Milton Friedman
advocated monetary targets rather than
price-level targets as short-run guides
for policy because
Of the three guides listed [exchange
rates, price index, and money stock], the
price level is clearly the most important
in its own right. Other things the same,
it would be much the best of the alterna-
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tives.... But other things are not the
same.... We cannot predict at all accurate-
ly just what effect a particular monetary
action will have on the price level and,
equally important, just when it will have
that effect. Attempting to control directly
the price level is therefore likely to make
monetary policy itself a source of eco-
nomic disturbance because of false stops
and starts.
A long-term price-level objective would
not require the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) to react to the highly
variable monthly inflation reports on a
short-term basis. Since any one month's
report contains information mainly about
transitory effects, it may tell us very little
about the monetary trend. Yet, when the
monthly price-level changes are added
up over extended periods, the transitory
effects offset each other and the monetary
trend is revealed.
Analysts often look back to multipenod
averages of inflation in order to discern
the underlying trend. The longer the
period of averaging, the less important
are the transitory effects of real shocks.
Thus, in discussing long-term trends,
analysts may look at inflation averages
going back as far as two to five years. In
a sense, the price level is the longest
average of all, inasmuch as it is theFIGURE 2 A PRICE-LEVEL OBJECTIVE
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accumulation of all monthly price
changes dating back to the beginning
of the index. Unlike the inflation rate,
which is highly variable around its
trend, the price level maintains a steady
relationship vis-a-vis its trend. Thus,
the behavior of the price level, when
observed against the backdrop of a tar-
get path, should provide a steady signal
about the thrust of future policy.
Admittedly, the relationship of the current
price level to its long-term target path
would not tell us what policymakers
should do today. Intermediate targets for
money or other short-term indicators of
policy are still needed to make these
near-term decisions. The value of the
price-level target is that it would pro-
vide a benchmark for long-run deci-
sionmaking. For example, consider the
decision that the Federal Reserve must
make at the beginning of a new year
when the monetary targets are set. If in
the previous year the price level was
below the long-term path and M2 came
in below the midpoint of its target
range, the price-level objective would
provide clear guidance for raising the
M2 path. In the absence of an explicit
long-term objective, the FOMC cannot




There is little doubt that a path for the
price level would provide an anchor for
the dollar. Some analysts fear, how-
ever, that such a path would limit the
Federal Reserve's flexibility in meeting
its additional responsibilities (such as
conducting countercyclical policy and
acting as the lender of last resort during
financial crises). We believe such fears
are unwarranted. Currently, the public
cannot clearly distinguish a counter-
cyclical policy action from one that
leads to a higher inflation trend. This
confusion limits the Fed's ability to
conduct countercyclical policy because it
induces, at least temporarily, a trade-off
between the short-run growth objective
and expectations of higher inflation rates
in the future. The presence of an explicit
path for the price level would enhance
the System's ability to communicate
policy intentions accurately and, more im-
portant, would provide a benchmark
against which to judge this communication.
Under the present system, the Federal Re-
serve is often constrained by financial
market expectations. These constraints
show up when the market confuses a
short-term policy action with a permanent
change in long-term goals. For example,
in 1982,1986, and 1991, the System im-
plemented a series of discount-rate cuts
in response to weakness in the economy.
In each case, the final cut was associated
with a subsequent increase in the long-
term bond rate. In no instance did the Fed
consciously adopt a higher inflation ob-
jective with its last discount-rate cut, yet
the market responded as if it had. Such
responses reduce the efficacy of policy
actions and would be less likely to occur
if the System committed to an explicit
path for the price level.
Moreover, a price-level objective would
not interfere with the Federal Reserve's
flexibility in responding to financial
crises. Consider the policy response to
the stock market crash of October 19,
1987. To prevent a systemic crisis in the
nation's financial system, the Fed imme-
diately eased policy by providing all the
liquidity the market needed. The time
horizon for maintaining liquidity in the
market is much shorter than that forstabilizing the price level. Thus, there
was plenty of time following the crash
for the FOMC to mop up the excess
liquidity that had been pumped into the
market.
Perhaps an even more important conse-
quence of achieving price stability is that
it would reduce the incidence of financial
crises. As economist Anna Schwartz has
documented, high and uncertain inflation
greatly increases the risk of bank failures
and bank runs. That is, financial crises
usually occur when prices are falling rela-
tive to trend. A price-level objective
would enhance financial stability and
make such incidents less likely.
• Conclusion
Price stability is not an end in itself. The
reason for seeking price stability is to
raise living standards and the quality of
life for all Americans. Monetary targeting
was effective in containing the runaway
inflation of the 1970s, but it has not
brought about the end of inflation.
Committing to a long-term trend for a
particular price index would help to pro-
vide guidance for adjusting monetary tar-
gets and maintaining price stability. Such
a policy would reduce relative price un-
certainty as well as increase the System's
flexibility in responding to short-term
events. Achieving price stability would
create an environment less prone to finan-
cial crises and at the same time give the
Federal Reserve more latitude in deal-
ing with such emergencies when they
arise.
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